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1 With his Presidential Address to the APA Hubert Dreyfus initiated a series of exchanges
with John McDowell regarding the role of conceptual capacities in our openness to the
world. According to Dreyfus, McDowell is able to “successfully describe the upper floors
of the edifice of knowledge” only at the high price of “ignoring the embodied coping
going on on the ground floor" (Dreyfus 2005: 37).  By defending the view that human
experience and action is infused with reason, McDowell supposedly falls for what Dreyfus
calls ‘The Myth of the Mental,’ an intellectualist position according to which “mind is
everywhere the pure given is not” (Dreyfus 2005: 52). In Dreyfus’ words, “the Myth of the
Mental is just this transcendental claim that every way we relate to the world must be
pervaded by conceptual, rational, mental activity” (Dreyfus 2009: 2). The problem with
this intellectualist position, according to Dreyfus, is that it ignores instances of embodied
coping  from which  conceptual  mindedness  is  completely  absent.  When  we  are  fully
absorbed in action we respond to different solicitations and affordances in a way that
need not be conceptualized or articulated in thought. The world we live in is a “shifting
field of attractions and repulsions” (Dreyfus 2009: 5), which is neither conceptual nor
rational in any way. Indeed, this seems to be the position defended by Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, who, according to Dreyfus, develop phenomenological approaches that
successfully register embodied coping. 
2 In order to counter Dreyfus’  objections,  McDowell  has to show that the thesis of the
pervasiveness  of  mind  is  continuous  with,  and  in  fact  supplements,  a  proper
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phenomenology  of  embodied  coping  skills.  To  do  so,  he  has  to  challenge  Dreyfus’
conception of mindedness as “detached from immersion in activity” (McDowell 2009b:
324), and show that even absorbed coping is pervaded by conceptuality and rationality.
This, however, is not an easy thing to achieve, especially when we consider the rich and
detailed phenomenological  descriptions  provided by Dreyfus  as  evidence of  the non-
rational and non-conceptual nature of absorbed coping. Not only must McDowell provide
an account of the pervasiveness of conceptuality in our openness to the world; he must do
so without neglecting and distorting the phenomenon of coping. Fortunately, he is not
alone  in  this  task:  in  fact,  McDowell  is  very  close  to  the  philosophical  tradition  of
hermeneutics  that  came into  prominence  in  the  twentieth  century  with  figures  like
Martin  Heidegger  and Hans-Georg  Gadamer.  This  kinship,  however,  is  discounted by
Dreyfus’  famous  interpretation of  Heidegger,  which reduces  our  most  basic  mode of
Being-in-the-world to the non-rational and non-conceptual. Of Course, Dreyfus concedes
that in Mind and World McDowell “sounds as if he is channeling Heidegger when he speaks
of ‘our unproblematic openness to the world’ and how ‘we find ourselves always already
engaged with the world’” (Dreyfus 2009: 1). However, he claims the parallel comes to an
abrupt  end  where  McDowell  speaks  of  our  openness  to  the  world  as  a  ‘conceptual’
activity.  According  to  Dreyfus,  Heidegger’s  ‘world’  is  an  interconnected  totality  of
solicitations that is opened to us “only through our unthinking and unthinkable engaged
perception and coping” (Dreyfus 2005: 59). My main purpose in this paper is to present an
alternative reading of Heidegger that places him closer to John McDowell, and further
removed  from  Dreyfus’  existential  phenomenology.  By  briefly  examining  some  key
concepts  of  Heidegger’s  early hermeneutics,  I  will  try to elucidate his  affinities  with
McDowell’s project and examine the possibility of a shared answer to Dreyfus’ objections. 
 
The Meaningful World of McDowell and Heidegger
3 In her article Hermeneutics Cristina Lafont defends the view that 
the central feature of Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn lies in his replacement of the
subject-object model, that is, the model of an observing subject posed over against
the world as the totality of entities, by the hermeneutic model of an understanding
Dasein which finds itself always already in a symbolically structured world. (Lafont
2004: 6) 
4 At first,  it  might come as a shock that Lafont refers here to the world in terms of a
symbolic structure – especially if we accept Dreyfus’ interpretation of ‘world’ as a web of
non-conceptual,  non-rational  solicitations.  To  say  that  the  world  is  symbolically
structured is to commit oneself to the view that our openness to the world is “conceptual
all the way down,” as McDowell likes to put it. But can we really attribute this view to
Heidegger? First of all it is important to appreciate that, for Heidegger, far from a totality
of objects, 
worldhood is constituted in references, and these references themselves stand in
referential correlations, referential totalities. It is not things but references which
have the primary function in the structure of encounter belonging to the world.
(Heidegger 1992: 200) 
5 Dreyfus seems to acknowledge this structure of references when he speaks about the web
of solicitations, attractions and repulsions that constitute our openness to the world. He
even goes so far as to say that these solicitations have their own kind of intelligibility,
which is not reducible to the kind of intelligibility proper to rationality and conceptual
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meaning. But rather than as a context of meaningful relations, Dreyfus’ existential notion
of “world” is composed by forces that attract and repel us – a model which does not
require  concepts  and  in  fact  precludes  them.  The  problem with  this  interpretation,
however, is that it ignores Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘meaningfulness’ (Bedeutsamkeit) as
the constitutive structure behind his original concept of world. In a lecture presented two
years before the publication of Being and Time, we find the following illuminating passage:
When we say that the basic structure of worldhood, the being of the entity which
we call world, lies in meaningfulness, this amounts to saying that the structure as
we have characterized it thus far, the references and the referential contexts, are
basically correlations of meaning, meaningful contexts. (Heidegger 1992: 203)
6 This  by  itself  does  not  undermine  Dreyfus’  thesis  that  the  ‘world’  has  its  own non-
conceptual,  non-rational  intelligibility.  Someone  sympathetic  with  his  interpretation
could still argue that Heidegger’s notion of meaningfulness refers to the understanding
we  posses  by  virtue  of  being  unthinkingly  absorbed  in  a  web  of  non-conceptual
solicitations. Nevertheless, the problem with a reading along these lines is that it fails to
grasp  the  relationship  that  Heidegger  is  trying  to  establish  between  the  notion  of
Bedeutsamkeit and linguistic meaning. In the same lecture cited above, Heidegger points to
this relation when he frankly admits that he was unable to find a better expression that
would 
give voice to an essential connection of the phenomenon with what we designate as
meaning  in  the  sense  of  the  meaning  of  words,  inasmuch as  the  phenomenon
possesses just such an intrinsic connection with verbal meaning,  discourse. (Heidegger
1992: 202) 
7 Beyond  our  ability  to  respond  unthinkingly  to  a  constellation  of  attractions  and
repulsions,  our  most  basic  openness  to  the  world  consists  in  our capacity  to
understandingly navigate a system of meaningful relations. Certainly, Dreyfus is on the
right track when he recognizes that Heidegger seems to be a conceptualist with the claim
that,  “my  being  in  the  world  is  nothing  other  than  this  already-operating-with-
understanding” (Heidegger 1976: 144). Instead of just coping with the forces around us,
we live in the midst of a meaningful world that is  opened to us through our shared
traditions and language. 
8 Heidegger’s  revolutionary  notion  of  world  enables  us  to  think  of  human  beings  as
“inhabiting a symbolically structured context,  in which everything they encounter is
already understood as something or other” (Lafont 2007: 2). Furthermore, one of the main
features of his hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology was the discovery of the
as-structure that underlies and permits our openness to the world:
The ‘as’ makes up the structure of explicitness of something that is understood. In
dealing  with  what  is  environmentally  ready-to-hand  by  interpreting  it
circumspectively, we ‘see’ it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what we
have  thus  interpreted  need  not  necessarily  be  also taken  apart  by  making  an
assertion.  Any  mere  pre-predicative  seeing  of  the  ready-to-hand  is,  in  itself,
something which already understands and interprets. (Heidegger 1962: 189)
9 This passage suggests that Heidegger’s notion of world is not as non-conceptual and non-
rational as Dreyfus would like us to think. On the contrary, Heidegger’s emphasis on the
universality of the as-structure should be read as an indication that our openness to the
world is meaningful all the way down. Clearly, this conflicts with Dreyfus’ understanding
of  world  as  a  web of  solicitations  in  which we find ourselves  in  pure  absorbed and
unthinking immersion. For Heidegger what matters is that Dasein is always already open
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to a symbolically structured world of significance, which should not be confused with
Dreyfus’  world  of  interconnected  solicitations.  This  thought  is  compounded  when
Heidegger affirms that “being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of
relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for characterizing
any entity whatsoever” (Heidegger 1962: 107). That is to say, in our openness to the world
it is not to “attractions and repulsions” that we respond, but to the totality of significance
that is articulated in the traditions we inhabit and the language we speak. In one of his
early papers, Heidegger writes:
Factic life always moves within a particular interpretedness that has been handed
down,  or  revised,  or  worked  anew.  Circumspection  gives  to  life  its  world  as
interpreted according to  those  respects  in  which the  world  is  encountered and
expected as the comprehensive object of concern. These respects, which are for the
most part available in an implicit form, and into which factic life has simply slipped
by way of habit, prefigure the paths for the movement of caring upon which this
movement can actualize itself. (Heidegger 2007: 160)
10 What is so wonderful about this early passage is that it expresses the core of Heidegger’s
hermeneutic thought. Everything we encounter in the world is already understood as
something or other owing to the interpretations that have been handed down to us by
language  and  tradition.  There  is  nothing  mysterious  about  Heidegger’s  account  of
meaning; it is just the result of being raised in a certain way. As Lafont points out, “part of
what it takes to grow up into a culture, that is, to become familiar with the whole of
significations  available  within  it,  is  first  of  all  to  learn  the  normative  patterns  of
interpretation and conduct that such a culture prescribes” (Lafont 2007: 8). The same
point is made by McDowell in Mind and World in the context of his discussion of second
nature and our openness to the intelligibility of the space of reasons. There, his central
claim is that in our life “what we experience is not external to the realm of the kind of
intelligibility that is proper to meaning” (McDowell 1996: 72), and he echoes Heidegger in
claiming that all  we require to be open to the totality of  significance – the space of
reasons – is a proper upbringing. Once initiated into the traditions and practices of our
ancestors, we have our eyes opened to a world of meanings that ‘prefigure’ the way we
experience and understand everything around us. There is nothing unnatural about this
process  of  upbringing;  nothing,  at  any rate,  that  would mystify  our openness to the
world.  Although  it  is  easy  to  be  seduced  by  the  picture  of  a  supernatural  space  of
meaningfulness constituted “independently of anything specifically human,” McDowell
argues that our responsiveness to meaning “belongs to our way of actualizing ourselves
as animals” (McDowell 1996: 78).
 
The Pervasiveness of Meaning and Embodied Coping:
A Response to Dreyfus’ Objection
11 By exploring a little further this responsiveness to meaning that is so central for both
Heidegger and McDowell, we will be able to address some of Dreyfus’ objections regarding
embodied coping skills. As I mentioned above, Dreyfus thinks that McDowell’s account of
experience  (i.e.  being  conceptual  all  the  way down)  is  incompatible  with  a  proper
phenomenology of engaged action and perception. His basic idea is that 
if we understand concepts as context-free principles or rules that could be used to
guide actions or at least make them intelligible, a phenomenology of expert coping
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shows concepts to be absent or even get in the way of masterful response to the
specific situation. (Dreyfus 2005: 58) 
12 Moreover,  Dreyfus  claims  mindedness  is  the  enemy  of  embodied  coping  because  it
completely distorts the phenomenon of our openness to the world. On Dreyfus’ reading, a
proper phenomenology of expert coping shows that in immersed action we respond to
solicitations without concepts or rationality being involved. He gives the example of a
Grandmaster playing a form of chess called lightning chess in which all moves must be
carried out within a two minute frame. At such a speed, the player only has time to
respond to the solicitations of the game without thinking or stepping back to assess the
situation from a distance. Thus, Dreyfus concludes, to be absorbed in the game is to be
submerged in a field of forces that attract and repel us. “When the Grandmaster is playing
lightning chess he is simply responding to the patterns on the board. At this speed he
must  depend  entirely  on  perception  and  not  at  all  on  analysis  and  comparison  of
alternatives” (Dreyfus 2005: 53). Dreyfus is thus led to conclude that expertise does not
require concepts, just responsiveness to the web of solicitations that constitute the world
of absorbed coping. In this light, “masterful action does not seem to require or even to
allow placement in the space of reasons” (Dreyfus 2005: 58).
13 It is easy to see why from Dreyfus’ perspective McDowell must be wrong when he claims
that our openness to the world is conceptual all the way down. For Dreyfus rationality
entails  detachment  and  distance,  the  human  ability  to  step  back  and  reflect.
Consequently, McDowell’s world can only be a world of objective facts and propositional
structures to which we rationally respond from a distance. And as Dreyfus persistently
points out, in such a conception of ‘world’ there is no room for an appropriate account of
everyday absorbed coping; the phenomena is lost completely. What McDowell needs to
show, in order to meet Dreyfus’ objection, is that our meaningful (rational) openness to
the world is  not  something artificial  or  supernatural  but  just  our way of  actualizing
ourselves as animals. Moreover, if he wants to avoid the Myth of the Mental that Dreyfus
burdens him with, or the accusation of intellectualism, McDowell must demonstrate that
mindedness is not the enemy of embodied coping. 
14 Contrary to Dreyfus’ conception of rationality as the human ability to step back from
absorbed immersion,  McDowell  defends the view that mindedness is not absent from
engaged action and perception. Indeed, from his early essays, McDowell has persistently
pointed out the inconsistencies of a conception of rationality that understands concepts
as “context-free principles or rules that could be use to guide actions,” to use Dreyfus’
words. Following Aristotle’s notion of phronesis,  McDowell rejects the assumption that
concepts should be conceived of as detached universal rules that are to be applied to
particular situations. In other words, he rejects the idea “that the content of practical
wisdom, as Aristotle understands it, can be captured in general prescriptions for conduct,
determinately  expressively  independently  of  the  concrete  situations  in  which  the
phronimos is called on to act” (McDowell 2009a: 311). Nonetheless, if we really want to do
justice to McDowell’s view of concepts we must acknowledge the huge influence that Kant
– one his great philosophical heroes – exerts on his thinking. In the opening lines of Mind
and World,  just  after  stating that  his  general  topic  is  “the way concepts  mediate the
relation between minds and the world,” McDowell makes the following claim: “One of my
main aims is to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion on the
way thought bears on reality” (McDowell 1994: 3). McDowell appeals to Kant’s conception
of empirical intuitions in the first Critique in order to support his idea that conceptual
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capacities  are  drawn  on  in receptivity.  Based  on  his  reading  of  the  Transcendental
Deduction  he  arrives  to  the  conclusion  that  one  of  Kant’s  main  insights  was  the
realization  that  intuitions  should  be  conceived  of  as  “configurations  in  sensory
receptivity  that  are  categorically  structured”  (McDowell  2009c:  127).  But  McDowell
doesn’t stop here. He also wants to preserve the Kantian relation between conceptual
capacities  and spontaneity,  understood as  the  freedom that  allows  us  to  reflectively
participate in what Wilfrid Sellars has called the ‘space of reasons.’ In lecture III of Mind
and World we find the following revealing passage,
The  way  I  am  exploiting  the  Kantian  idea  of  spontaneity  commits  me  to  a
demanding interpretation of words like “concept” and “conceptual.” It is essential
to conceptual  capacities,  in the demanding sense,  that  they can be exploited in
active thinking, thinking that is open to reflection about its own credentials. When
I say the content of experience is conceptual, that is what I mean by “conceptual.”
(McDowell 1994: 47) 
15 McDowell connects the idea of conceptual capacities with a notion of rationality that
requires the ability to step back from embodied coping and reflectively respond to the
norms  of  reason.  However,  what  is  crucial  here  is  to  realize  that  McDowell  is  not
suggesting that the ability to assess reasons through judgment and reflective thinking
should be operative all the time. All that matters is that the rational subject possesses the
capacity  to  step  back  from embodied  coping  and  rationally  assess  the  situation.1 Of
course, McDowell concedes that when we are absorbed in engaged bodily action we are
not exercising the ability to step back. Nevertheless he wants to insist that “the capacities
that  are  operative  in  ordinary  engagement  with  the  world  belong  to  the  subject’s
rationality in the strong sense” (McDowell 2009: 324). Ultimately, McDowell establishes
this  connection  between  conceptual  capacities  and  spontaneity  because  he  needs  to
dodge  the  “Myth  of  the  Given”  and  show  that  receptivity  doesn’t  make  “an  even
notionally separable contribution to its co-operation with spontaneity” (McDowell 1994:
51). With this he achieves one of the main goals of his philosophical project, namely, the
defense of what he calls minimal empiricism. McDowell argues that if we want to do justice
to the empiricist claim that experience has an epistemic role, we have to endorse the idea
that  the  world  exerts  rational  constraint  over  human  beings.  And  as  McDowell  has
persuasively shown throughout his work, this is only possible if spontaneity ‘goes all the
way down.’ 
16 Dreyfus is  certainly right  when he claims that  the ability  to step back is  crucial  for
McDowell’s  understanding  of  conceptual  capacities.  However,  as  we  have  seen,
McDowell’s picture of rationally is much more complex. For one thing, it is clear that for
McDowell mindedness is not the enemy of embodied coping but just the opposite; it is the
condition for the possibility of human experience. Opposing Dreyfus’ excessively narrow
conception of rationality as “detached conceptual intentionality,” McDowell defends the
view that our absorbed coping “is part of the way of being that is special to rational
animals” (McDowell 2009a: 315). In other words, our absorption in the world does not
entail leaving our rationality aside and letting our animal nature take over. This bizarre
split between the rational and the animal is rather the consequence of Dreyfus’ notion of
rationality as something detached from worldly engagement. Thus, he can sincerely claim
that happily for us, “we are only part-time rational animals” (Dreyfus 2007a: 354) the rest
of  the  time we  are  just  animals  responding  to  attractions  and repulsions  like  other
members of the animal kingdom. To put it in McDowell’s terms, according to Dreyfus we
are  “peculiarly  bifurcated  with  a  foothold  in  the  animal  kingdom and  a  mysterious
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separate involvement in an extra-natural world of rational connections” (McDowell 1994:
78). This is precisely the idea that McDowell wants to challenge when he introduces the
notion of second nature, and the related distinction between inhabiting an environment
and having an orientation to the world.
17 Our responsiveness to the space of  reasons is  not the detached activity that Dreyfus
pictures, but our own way of actualizing ourselves as animals. In McDowell’s words, “we
need to see ourselves as animals whose natural  being is  permeated with rationality”
(McDowell 1994: 85). In our brief discussion of the notion of ‘world’ in the philosophy of
the young Heidegger, we suggested that, by virtue of our human upbringing, our eyes are
opened to a world that is no longer a field of attractions and repulsions but a ‘totality of
significance.’ In Being and Time Heidegger makes clear that, “this everyday way in which
things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance,
with never  a  possibility  of  extrication” (Heidegger 1962:  213).  McDowell  arrives  at  a
similar conclusion when, drawing from a reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,  he
introduces the notion of second nature in lecture IV of Mind and World. Through a normal
human upbringing, we obtain a second nature that enables us to recognize the dictates of
reason and participate in the space of meaning. “Human beings acquire a second nature
by being initiated into conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the logical
space of reasons” (McDowell 1994: xx). Upbringing (Bildung) is not a mysterious process
whereby human beings gain access to a supernatural structure but the “normal coming to
maturity of the kind of animals we are” (McDowell 1994: 88). Rather than thinking of
reason as a mysterious thing that is added to our underlying animal nature, McDowell
argues that we must see rationality and openness to meaning as constitutive elements
making us the kind of creatures we are. Once our eyes are opened to the demands of the
space of  reasons,  there is  no going back,  it  becomes part of  our animal nature.  This
doesn’t mean that we become some sort of artificial beings mysteriously responding to a
supernatural structure. In fact, when our eyes are opened to the requirements of reason,
what we see is nothing spooky but the world itself.
18 Certainly,  if  Dreyfus  had a  notion of  second nature,  he  wouldn’t  be  so  disturbed by
McDowell’s suggestion that absorbed coping is permeated with mindedness. Instead, he
would see that a “normal mature human being is a rational animal, with its rationality
part of its animal, and so natural, being, not a mysterious foothold in another realm”
(McDowell 1994: 91). Although we share perception with other members of the animal
kingdom, our perceptual sensitivity to the environment is informed by mindedness and
reason. To participate and respond to the demands of the space of reason is our way of
actualizing ourselves as animals, as McDowell likes to put it. Thus, “we have what mere
animals have, perceptual sensitivities to features of our environment, but we have it in a
special form” (McDowell 1994: 64). While animals respond to the biological imperatives of
their environment – what Dreyfus calls attractions and repulsions – human beings have
an orientation toward the world. When a decent upbringing (Bildung) opens our eyes to
the space of  reasons “our lives come to embrace not just  coping with problems and
exploiting opportunities, constituted as such by immediate biological imperatives, but
exercising  spontaneity”  (McDowell  1994:  115).  Therefore,  our  openness  to  the  world
shouldn’t  be  assimilated  to  the  model  of  animal  coping,  precisely  because  when we
acquire second nature the world is no longer a succession of problems and opportunities
but a context of meaning. The difference between inhabiting an environment and having
an orientation  towards  the  world  (an  idea  that  McDowell  borrows  from Hans-Georg
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Gadamer) indicates the ‘free and distanced orientation’ we gain once Bildung has opened
our eyes to the space of reasons. Unlike human beings, Gadamer writes, “other creatures
do  not  have  a  relationship  to  the  world,  but  are,  as  it  were,  embedded  in  their
environment” (Gadamer 2006: 441). Once again it is important to insist that this ‘free and
distanced orientation’ is not to be equated with detachment and distance from practical
engagement, but with a normative status that is acquired through normal upbringing. 
19 Whereas the environment is just a web of solicitations for the creature that is embedded
in it, “the world is where a human being lives, where she is at home” (McDowell 1994:
118). This, however, is not to say that human beings are free from biological imperatives
and the solicitations of the environment. On the contrary, what McDowell wants to show
is that once we acquire second nature, our relation to the environment is transformed and
becomes something different. In his response to Dreyfus we find the following passage:
There is more to our embodied coping than there is to the embodied coping of non-
rational animals. Becoming open to the world, not just able to cope with an
environment, transforms the character of the disclosing that perception does for
us, including the disclosing of affordances that, if we had not achieved openness to
the world, would have belonged to a merely animal competence at inhabiting an
environment. (McDowell 2009a: 315)
20 The main idea here is that “our embodied coping is not exhausted by its similarity to the
embodied  coping  of  non-rational  animals”  (McDowell  2009a:  317).  From  McDowell’s
perspective, Dreyfus is wrong when he claims that human beings share absorbed coping
with infants and animals. And he is not alone in this conclusion. Both Heidegger and
Gadamer  make  very  clear  that  openness  to  the  world  is  an  exclusively  human
phenomenon. As we have seen from our brief overview of Heidegger’s notion of world,
once  we  learn  how  to  speak,  our  experience  is  no  longer  a  response  to  a  field  of
attractions and repulsions but an active participation in a world of  meaning.  This  is
precisely  the  idea  that  Heidegger  wants  to  defend  with  the  introduction  of  the  as-
structure, which lies at the heart of his hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology.
Dreyfus, however, misrepresents this crucial idea when he says that for Heidegger most
of our activities “don’t have a situation specific as-structure” (Dreyfus 2007b: 371). We
have  seen  that  for  Heidegger  our  openness  to  the  world  is  always  mediated  by
understanding,  which means that  the as-structure is constitutive for what we are as
human beings.  On the other  hand,  “the animal’s  behavior  is  never  an apprehending
something as something. Insofar as we address this possibility of taking something as
something as characteristic of the phenomenon of world, the as-structure is an essential
determination of the structure of the world” (Heidegger 2001: 311). In plain and simple
terms, animals and infants don’t have a world, and they don’t have it precisely because
they  have  no  access  to  the  as-structure  that  we  acquire  through  normal  human
upbringing and language. 
21 Although it  is  uncertain  whether  McDowell  would accept  the  universality  of  the  as-
structure,2 it might be helpful to illustrate his conception of mindful absorbed coping
with  some  assistance  from  this  Heideggerian  notion.  Imagine  a  simple  action  like
entering a room through a door.  It  is  true that  a  trained dog or monkey can easily
perform the same action and successfully enter the room after opening the door. The
question  here  is  whether  human  action  can  be  exhausted  “by  its  similarity  to  the
embodied coping of non-rational animals.”3 It is clear that Dreyfus answer would be ‘yes’:
absorbed coping is the same for infants, animals, and human beings. If I am absorbed in
the activity of opening a door, “I don’t see the doorknob as a doorknob” (Dreyfus 2007a:
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361),  but  just  respond to the solicitations of  the situation and enter the room.  This,
however, conflicts with Heidegger’s insistence on the universality of the as-structure and
his refusal to accept that animals have a world. According to Heidegger, “an animal can
only behave but can never apprehend something as something –which is not to deny that
the animal sees or even perceives. Yet in a fundamental sense the animal does not have
perception”  (Heidegger  2001:  259).  Evidently  this  fragment  is  closer  in  spirit  to
McDowell’s philosophical project than it is to Dreyfus’ existential phenomenology. For
human beings, opening a door is much more than just responding to situation-specific
solicitations; it is an activity that involves conceptual mindedness and meaningfulness. In
other words, when we enter the room what we experience is the door as a door and not a
mysterious field of  forces pushing us to act  in a certain way.  We don’t  just  respond
automatically to solicitations; we understand solicitations as this or that. Thus, “a human
individual’s relation to affordances is no longer what it would have been if she had gone
on living the life of a non-rational animal” (McDowell 2009a: 315). Since McDowell and
Heidegger each share the view that in normal human experience what is disclosed is a
world of significance in which we dwell understandingly, they have no problem providing
an account of absorbed coping that includes mindedness and meaning. 
22 What ultimately lies at the heart of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate is a contrast between
two different views of what it is to be a human being. While Dreyfus thinks we are only
part-time rational animals, McDowell advances the idea that rationality is not alien to our
animal nature. I think it is not unfair to say that Dreyfus falls prey to a Cartesian dualism4
between mind and body that makes him blind not only to McDowell’s proposal, but also
to  some of  the  key  insights  of  one  of  his  phenomenological  heroes,  namely,  Martin
Heidegger.  With  his  rigid  distinction  between  the  rational  and  the  animal,  Dreyfus
departs from Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a human being. In his existential
phenomenology, “reason is separated from our animal nature, as if being rational placed
us partly outside the animal kingdom” (McDowell 1994: 108).  McDowell,  on the other
hand,  follows  Aristotle  and supplies  a  very  convincing account  of  the  way in  which
rationality and animal nature go hand in hand. Accordingly, responsiveness to reasons
should be seen as part of what Wittgenstein calls our natural history; “the natural history
of creatures whose nature is largely second nature” (McDowell 1994: 95). Unfortunately,
Dreyfus’ narrow conception of rationality restrain him from seeing that mindedness is
not the enemy of our being-in-the-world, but its very possibility.
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NOTES
1. McDowell’s position regarding this issue is succinctly summarized in the following passage:
“Let me stress that what matters is the capacity to step back and assess whether putative reasons
warrant action or belief. If someone actually steps back, of course that shows she has the capacity
to do so. But if the capacity is present without being exercised, we have in view someone who can
respond to reasons as the reasons they are. And rationality in the sense I am explaining may be
actually operative even though the capacity to step back is not being exercised. Acting for a
reason, which one is responding to as such, does not require that one reflects about whether
some consideration is a sufficient rational warrant for something it seems to recommend. It is
enough that one could” (McDowell 2009c: 129). 
2. Here there seems to be some tension between McDowell’s insistence on a formal account of the
role  of  conceptuality  in  our openness  to  the world and the hermeneutic  philosophy of  both
Heidegger  and  Gadamer.  Indeed,  the  as-structure  of  understanding  implies  more than  just
categorically unified experiences; it prescribes the specific way in which things show up in the
world as something or other. Thus what we experience, according to Heidegger, is a manifold
that is already articulated and ‘carved out,’ to use McDowell’s expression.
3. A similar question is raised by Heidegger in the following passage: “But a skilful monkey or
dog can also open a door to come in and out. Certainly. The question is whether what it does
when it touches and pushes something is to touch a handle, whether what it does is something
like opening a door. We talk as if the dog does the same as us; but there is not the slightest
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criterion to say that it comports itself towards the entity, even though it relates to what we know
as an entity” (GA 27, 192 trans. Cristina Lafont).
4. This point is made by McDowell in “Response to Dreyfus,” where he accuses Dreyfus of “taking
for granted that mindedness is detached from engagement in bodily life” (McDowell 2009b: 328).
ABSTRACTS
In  this  paper  I  will  explore  the  philosophical  exchange  between  Hubert  Dreyfus  and  John
McDowell regarding the role of conceptual capacities in our openness to the world. According to
Dreyfus, McDowell fails to do justice to instances of embodied coping from which conceptual
mindedness is completely absent. That is to say, when we are fully, pre-reflectively absorbed in
our activities, we respond to the affordances and solicitations of the environment without the
assistance of mindedness or conceptual articulation. On Dreyfus’ view, McDowell displays serious
symptoms  of  ‘intellectualism’  –  privileging  the  higher  levels  of  our  cognitive  abilities  and
overlooking what occurs in engaged,  bodily activity.  In order to counter Dreyfus’  objections,
McDowell  must  provide  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  pervasiveness  of  conceptuality  in  our
openness to the world, without neglecting and distorting the phenomenon of embodied coping.
Fortunately,  he is  not alone in this task:  in fact,  McDowell  is  very close to the philosophical
tradition of hermeneutics that came into prominence in the twentieth century with thinkers like
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  This affinity,  however,  is  discounted by Dreyfus’
reading  of  Heidegger  with  its  emphatic  insistence  on  the  preconceptual  and  prelinguistic
character of our most basic openness to the world. My main purpose in this paper is to suggest
an  alternative  reading  of  Heidegger  that  places  him  closer  to  John  McDowell,  and  further
removed from Dreyfus’ phenomenology of absorbed coping. 
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